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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST ARMED ACTION IN THE PHILIPPINES DURING NOVEMBER



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


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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST ARMED ACTION IN THE PHILIPPINES DURING NOVEMBER

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it.



PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST ARMED ACTION IN THE PHILIPPINES DURING NOVEMBER

1. Statement of the Problem.


To estimate the likelihood of a major Communist-armed action in the Philippines during November and the probable consequences of any such action as might be attempted.

2. The Huks.

The Huks (Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan) are today the army of Philippine Communism, led by avowed Communists who follow the policies and seek to further the objectives of World Communism. Their armed strength is estimated at no more than about 10,000. The Huks are essentially a guerrilla organization, utilizing "hit and run" tactics; making maximum use of the elements of surprise, choice of terrain, and mobility; and avoiding frontal engagement with government forces. The Huks, who are limited almost exclusively to infantry weapons, have the capability of mounting several comparatively large-scale (300-500 men) coordinated attacks simultaneously against widely separated targets. They are also capable of extensive sabotage.

3. Prospects for Imminent Huk Operations.

In past months, there have been many reports, generally of low evaluation, concerning impending Huk actions varying in scale from major disturbances in Manila to raids on outlying villages or isolated installations. The specific dates involved have often coincided with national or Communist holidays. Many of these reports probably were inspired by the Huks themselves as part of a calculated program to confuse the military authorities and terrorize the populace. Thus far, on past dates specified, Huk activity either completely failed to materialize or was on a scale considerably less than predicted.



Thus, regardless of whether the Huks actually had plans for offensive operations during November, the element of surprise-essential for the most successful implementation of such plans—has been reduced. Nevertheless, the intended operation will not necessarily have been called off nor will it be possible for security forces to prevent widespread attacks resulting in extensive disturbance and destruction. Because of the Government's state of alert, a major concerted effort against so strongly defended an area as Manila is improbable. A Huk attempt to attain other more limited objectives in the Manila area, including the assassination of Government officials, the sabotage of public utilities and attacks on military and police installations, is more likely. There is no direct evidence that attacks will be specifically directed at US installations and personnel and such attacks are judged to be improbable. Nevertheless, raids and incidental damage may occur.

4. Relative Military Capabilities of Opposing Forces.

Some 25,000 men of the Philippine Constabulary and Ground Force are presently engaged in internal security missions, the bulk em-

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ployed against the Huks (see map). This force is believed capable of preventing the violent overthrow of the Philippine Government by the Huks during November. Moreover, it is estimated that military units in the vicinity of Manila are able to defend the city against attack but not to prevent acts of terrorism within the Manila area.

The Huks, whose armed strength comprises some 10,000 men, are unable to prevent the movement of Philippine units wherever such troops might be committed. The Huks are, however, capable of avoiding destruction at the hands of the Philippine Armed Forces and of conducting raids at will throughout the Luzon countryside.

During the past few weeks, Philippine security forces have undertaken widespread operations against the Huks throughout Luzon. Thus far, no decisive Philippine suc-

cesses have been reported and Philippine intelligence agencies have simultaneously noted some increase in Huk activities and movements. This increase in Huk activity, despite security operations, strongly indicates that Government measures against the Huks, as in the past, continue to be ineffective in preventing a continuing increase in Huk capabilities.


5. Short-Term Effects of Possible Huk Armed Action.

Successful large-scale Huk raids throughout the Luzon countryside, coordinated with disturbances in Manila, would further alarm the Philippine people, increase popular distrust of the Quirino regime, and enhance over-all Communist capabilities. Such success could be expected to encourage further and bolder Huk operations.

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